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ABSTRACT
Diverse species exhibit cultural traditions, i.e. population-specific profiles of socially 
learned traits, from songbird dialects to primate tool-use behaviors. However, only 
humans appear to possess cumulative culture, in which cultural traits increase in 
complexity over successive generations. Theoretically, it is currently unclear what 
factors give rise to these phenomena, and consequently why cultural traditions are 
found in several species but cumulative culture in only one. Here, we address this by 
constructing and analyzing cultural evolutionary models of both phenomena that 
replicate empirically attestable levels of cultural variation and complexity in 
chimpanzees and humans. In our model of cultural traditions (Model 1), we find that 
realistic cultural variation between populations can be maintained even when 
individuals in different populations invent the same traits and migration between 
populations is frequent, and under a range of levels of social learning accuracy. This 
lends support to claims that putative cultural traditions are indeed cultural (rather than 
genetic) in origin, and suggests that cultural traditions should be widespread in species
capable of social learning. Our model of cumulative culture (Model 2) indicates that 
both the accuracy of social learning and the number of cultural demonstrators interact 
to determine the complexity of a trait that can be maintained in a population. 
Combining these models (Model 3) creates two qualitatively distinct regimes in which
there are either a few, simple traits, or many, complex traits. We suggest that these 
regimes correspond to nonhuman and human cultures, respectively. The rarity of 
cumulative culture in nature may result from this interaction between social learning 
accuracy and number of demonstrators.
Keywords: animal culture; cultural evolution; demography; innovation; social 
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1. Introduction
Many animal species exhibit social learning, i.e. the acquisition of information from 
conspecifics through learning (Galef and Laland, 2005); examples include the 
transmission of food preferences in rats (Laland and Plotkin, 1990), shoaling routes 
and nest site locations in fish (Helfman and Schultz, 1984), and foraging locations in 
bees and ants (Leadbeater and Chittka, 2007). Some of these species show cultural 
differences in the ‘trait-profiles’ of different populations, termed cultural traditions 
(Fragaszy and Perry, 2003). Examples include differences in the song dialects of 
different bird populations (Catchpole and Slater, 1995) and in the presence or absence 
of various tool-use and gestural behaviors in different populations of chimpanzees 
(Lycett et al., 2007; Whiten et al., 1999), orangutans (van Schaik et al., 2003) and 
capuchins (Perry et al., 2003). Humans, however, as well as exhibiting social learning 
and cultural traditions, appear to be the only species to unambiguously also have 
cumulative culture, where cultural traits are preserved and modified over successive 
generations resulting in a ‘ratcheting up’ of the complexity or efficiency of those traits
(Boyd and Richerson, 1996; Dean et al., 2013; Enquist et al., 2011; Tomasello, 1999). 
A common criterion for cumulative culture is that cultural traits become too complex 
for a single individual to invent in their lifetime. Whereas this does not appear to 
apply to any non-human cultural traits, such as chimpanzee nut-cracking, birdsong 
dialects or fish shoaling routes (although for possible reports in chimpanzees see 
Boesch et al., 2009; Sanz et al., 2010), such traits are commonplace in human cultural 
endeavors such as technology, science, and mathematics (Basalla, 1988; May, 1966; 
Oswalt, 1976; Price, 1963; Wilder, 1968). It is highly unlikely that string theory, 
smartphones and space travel, for example, lie within the inventive capacities of a 
single individual. Even so-called ‘simple’ early human technologies, such as certain 
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types of stone tools, show evidence of having accumulated in complexity over 
multiple generations (Lycett and von Cramon-Taubadel, 2013; Roche, 2005; Simão, 
2002). This cumulative culture, it is argued, has been instrumental in allowing our 
species to invade and inhabit virtually every terrestrial environment on the planet, 
while our closest primate relatives remain highly restricted in range and number 
(Boyd et al., 2011; Hill et al., 2009).
Our aim here is to construct simple models to identify the potential factors responsible
for both the emergence and maintenance of cultural traditions, and for the shift from 
cultural traditions to cumulative culture that appears to be a hallmark of our species. 
Models are particularly useful here given the difficulty of directly studying such 
phenomena. Comparative studies have begun to address the underlying cognitive 
abilities that allow humans and other great ape species to solve simple cumulative-like
tasks (Dean et al., 2012). However, comparative studies are limited because (i) only a 
single extant species (Homo sapiens) has cumulative culture, thus providing limited 
data points to test causal hypotheses, and (ii) the acquisition of cumulative cultural 
traits in humans typically takes many years and is thus not amenable to experimental 
investigation. Archaeological evidence can be used to indicate the emergence of 
cumulative culture in the Homo lineage (d'Errico and Stringer, 2011; Roche, 2005). 
However, the archaeological record provides only indirect evidence of the cognitive 
or demographic changes that might be associated with these phenomena. 
Previous models have examined either the evolutionary origin of social learning (Aoki
et al., 2005; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Enquist et al., 2007; Rogers, 1988), or the 
number of independent (non-cumulative) traits in a single population (Enquist et al., 
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2010; Lehmann et al., 2011; Strimling et al., 2009), or the dynamics of cumulative 
culture in a single population (Mesoudi, 2011; Pradhan et al., 2012) or at a 
macroscopic level that does not permit the study of demographic factors such as 
population size or migration (Enquist et al., 2011; Lewis and Laland, 2012). While all 
of these models have generated useful inferences about cultural dynamics, none have 
directly addressed the emergence and maintenance of between-group cultural 
traditions, which requires the simulation of multiple populations, and none have 
sought to explain the transition from non-cumulative traditions to cumulative culture. 
Here we attempt to fill this gap by first modelling cultural traditions and explicitly 
comparing our model output to empirical data on non-human primate traditions. We 
then present a model of cumulative culture that builds on previous individual-based 
models of non-cumulative culture. Finally, we combine these models, finding that the 
emergence of cumulative culture most likely occurred through the interaction of the 
accuracy of social learning and the number of demonstrators from whom individuals 
copy.
2. Model 1: Cultural traditions
We take as our starting point a model constructed by Strimling et al. (2009), in which 
independent (i.e. non-cumulative) cultural traits are acquired by individuals in a single
population. To this we add multiple populations and migration between those 
populations, in order to permit the emergence of between-population cultural 
traditions. In their model, Strimling et al. showed how the number of different traits 
found in the population and the number of traits known by each individual increased 
as a function of population size, individuals’ social learning accuracy, and individuals’
innovativeness. We are therefore interested in whether, and if so how, cultural 
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traditions are also shaped by these factors, in addition to the novel factor of migration.
As in Strimling et al.’s original model, we make several simplifying assumptions, 
such as that cultural traits have identical cultural fitness and have no effect on 
biological fitness, and that individuals do not vary in their social learning accuracy or 
innovativeness. While these assumptions are most likely unrealistic and deserve 
scrutiny in future research, these tactical simplifications allow us to focus on the 
aforementioned key factors that have been the subject of previous research 
(population size, social learning accuracy and individual innovativeness) in this new 
multi-group context.
Strimling et al’s (2009) model contains three stages. First, one of the N individuals in 
the population is picked at random, dies, and is replaced by a naive individual. 
Second, the naive individual picks one other individual at random and independently 
learns every trait that individual knows with probability a per trait (where 0 < a < 1). 
Third, the individual invents a random number of new traits with expectation μ. (Note 
that social learning and innovation are therefore modelled as separate processes; for 
simplicity, Strimling et al. assumed that social learning cannot itself give rise to new 
traits through inferential copying errors.) To this we add a fourth stage, in which the 
individual migrates to another population with probability 

m
2  (where 0 ≤ m ≤ 2). 
There are p such populations in the metapopulation, and the individual is equally 
likely to migrate to any of the p - 1 other populations. When the individual migrates, it
swaps population memberships with a randomly chosen member of its target 
population, so that the size of each population remains constant. Because each 
migration event involves two individuals and the target population is picked at 
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random, the expected number of individuals who migrate away from any given 
population in one timestep is 

m
2 
m
2 (p 1)
p 1  m
; this is why m is halved above.
In order to model multiple populations of such learners, we must also decide which 
traits individuals invent. Strimling et al. (2009) do not specify this, assuming only that
individuals always invent traits that are currently unknown in the population. 
Lehmann et al. (2011), using a similar model, assume that there are a very large 
number of traits, tending towards infinity, and individuals invent a random trait 
chosen from this set. This strikes us as unrealistic, particularly for foraging or gestural
behaviours that are constrained by the affordances of the objects and food types found
in a species’ habitat, and motor constraints on the possible gestures or calls that can be
produced. Thus, we assume instead that there are infinitely many traits which are 
invented in a fixed sequence that is the same in all populations. We use the simplest 
possible sequence, in which traits are labeled by the natural numbers and invented in 
the order 1, 2, 3, etc. Individuals always invent the first trait in the sequence that is not
currently known by any individual in their population. For example, if traits 1, 2, 4 
and 5 are present in the population, then a naïve individual will first invent trait 3, 
rather than trait 6. This represents an idealized situation in which individuals’ physical
and cognitive predispositions and the nature of their physical and social environments 
create a clear ranking in the “obviousness” of traits; for example, tool techniques for 
foraging easily-visible food resources may be invented before techniques for foraging 
hard-to-find foods, and foraging technologies in general may be invented before 
social or symbolic behaviors that are less important for survival. While this situation 
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is clearly idealized, it is more realistic than assuming random draws from a large set 
of traits, and it is simple enough to analyze. Note that, as in Strimling et al. and 
Lehmann et al.’s models, these traits are not cumulative; later traits do not build on 
earlier traits, and an individual can socially learn any set of traits irrespective of the 
traits’ position in the sequence. A trait may also be lost from the population and later 
re-invented without affecting any other traits.
Fig. 1 shows the time course and end result of one simulation of the model, at this 
point with no migration (i.e. m = 0). In this and all subsequent simulations we ran the 
model until the values of the various measurements (e.g. number of traits) had clearly 
reached a stable value and were performing random walks around that value. Fig. 1a 
shows that the number of different traits known in each population, called S by 
Strimling et al., hovers around the expected value they derived in their Equation 3, 
providing a replication of their model and confirming the validity of ours. Fig. 1b 
shows the trait-profiles present in each population at the end of the simulation. 
Intuitively, one expects that if all populations invent the same traits in the same order, 
different populations will have identical trait profiles. However, the trait-profiles in 
Fig. 1b clearly show variation between populations. To quantify this variation we 
define s, the cultural similarity between two populations, in the same way as Enquist 
et al. (2011): 

s  X YX Y .., where X is the set of traits known in the first population 
and Y is the set known in the second. Thus, s is the proportion of all traits known in 
either population that are known in both populations. To compare more than two 
populations we define 

s as the mean similarity between every possible combination of
populations in a metapopulation.
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[Figure 1 here]
Fig. 2 shows how the mean similarity between populations 

s increases with 
population size N (in a decelerating fashion) and accuracy of social learning a (in an 
accelerating fashion). Fig. 2c shows how 

s varies across the parameter space created 
by N and a, demonstrating that no realistic parameter values generate complete inter-
population homogeneity. The reason that the assumption of a fixed sequence of traits 
does not lead to complete inter-population homogeneity is trait loss due to imperfect 
social learning. We show in the Appendix that in the absence of migration, the 
probability that a trait will spread beyond its inventor is 

a
1 a . Since a must be less 
than 1, this probability is always less than ½. In other words, most newly invented 
traits die out with their inventor, even with high fidelity cultural transmission. This 
feature of the model accords reasonably with evidence on chimpanzee (P. t. 
schweinfurhii) inventions documented at Mahale, Tanzania, where approximately 
43% of innovations documented over a 30-year period did not spread (Nishida et al., 
2009). In the model, this frequent loss of traits is balanced by the re-invention of traits
that have been lost, and this dynamic creates the moderate (and realistic) dissimilarity 
between population trait-profiles.
[Figure 2 here]
We now analyze the effects of migration. Fig. 3 shows how the mean number of 
different traits known in a population 

S  and the mean similarity between populations
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
s both increase with m. We show values from simulations with m ranging from 0 (no 
migration) to 0.5 (half of all individuals migrate); the latter may be realistic in both 
chimpanzees, where one sex typically disperses (Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, Hasegawa, & 
Nishida, 1984), and humans, where there is frequent migration of both sexes (Hill et 
al., 2011). As expected, migration makes populations more similar in their trait-
profiles, but even frequent migration does not completely homogenize them. 
Migration also increases the total number of traits known, because migrants can bring 
traits that have not been invented in the target population; this resembles the 
beneficial effect of migration on accumulation found by Powell et al. (2009), but not 
as pronounced. A possible empirical example of this is the introduction of ant-fishing 
into the Kasekela chimpanzee (P. t. schweinfurthii) community by a female immigrant
from the Mitumba community at Gombe, Tanzania (O'Malley et al., 2012).
[Figure 3 here]
To compare the results shown in Fig. 3b with empirical data, we calculated the values 
of 

s from data reported on chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) (Whiten et al., 1999) and 
orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) (van Schaik et al., 2003), ignoring all comparisons 
involving traits thought to be absent for ecological reasons or insufficient observation.
The values of 

s were approximately 0.46 and 0.32, respectively. Note that these 
values probably underestimate the true values, because these studies only included 
traits that the investigators suspected a priori might vary between populations. With 
this in mind, Figs. 2c and 3 show that the model produces realistic between-
population variability. 
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3. Model 2: Cumulative culture
We now construct and analyse a model of cumulative culture in a single population, 
before adding the assumption of multiple populations in the following section. For our
cumulative culture model, we take as our starting point Enquist et al.’s (2010) model 
which expanded Strimling et al.’s (2009) to include multiple demonstrators. Hence 
our model has two parameters: a, the accuracy of social learning (as before), and n, 
the number of cultural models (where in Model 1, as well as in previous models of 
cumulative culture such as Mesoudi [2011], n = 1, but which in Model 2 can vary). As
in Model 1, both parameters are assumed to be constant across all individuals. The 
population consists of N individuals, and as above, in each time step a randomly 
chosen individual dies and is replaced by a naive individual. The individual then 
randomly picks n other individuals from the population to be its cultural 
demonstrators. The individual attempts to learn the trait from each of the n 
demonstrators in turn. Whether this learning is successful depends on whether or not 
the demonstrators carry the trait and on a. Finally, after attempting to learn socially 
from all n demonstrators, the individual innovates with probability μ.
The trait has an infinite number of complexity levels. Learning any given level is 
dependent on having learned all previous levels. The levels represent cumulative 
improvements that can be made to the basic, level 1 trait. Thus, they may roughly 
correspond to Oswalt's (1976) “techno-units,” or to successive modifications to a 
technology or social practice; plausible definitions and examples of different levels 
are given by Pradhan et al. (2012). In our model, individuals learn these levels as 
follows: for each demonstrator, the individual learns the first level of the trait that it 
does not already know with probability a, and moves on to the next level if successful,
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which it again learns with probability a, and so on. Thus the probability of a naive 
individual learning a given level l from a demonstrator who knows at least l levels of 
the trait is 

al . After social learning, each individual has a probability μ of improving 
its knowledge of the trait by one level through innovation.
We are interested in understanding how 

l, the mean level of cultural complexity that a
population maintains, depends on the accuracy of social learning a, the number of 
cultural models n, and the innovativeness μ. In each simulation of the model the 
population begins completely unknowledgeable. Fig. 4 shows the time course and end
result of one simulation of the model. In Fig. 4a we see that the mean level of the trait 
in the population initially rises and then stabilizes; Fig. 4b shows the resulting 
distribution of levels amongst the individuals of the population.
[Figure 4 here]
Fig. 5 shows the effects of a and n on the mean level 

l of the trait that is maintained in
the population. The mean level 

l increases linearly with n (Fig. 5a), and non-linearly 
with a (Fig. 5b). When varying the innovativeness μ in simulations, we found that 
increasing μ from 0.1 to 1 increases 

l by ≈ 3 regardless of the values of the other 
parameters; thus, the effects of a and n are much stronger than the effect of μ. This 
replicates previous modelling results that innovation is far less important for 
cumulative culture than is social learning accuracy (Lewis and Laland, 2012) or 
number of demonstrators (Enquist et al., 2010). 
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Fig. 5c shows how 

l varies across the parameter space created by a and n. Enquist et 
al. (2010) showed that only if an > 1 could the trait be stably maintained in the 
population through social learning in their model. Since the trait in their model 
corresponds to the basic level 1 trait of ours, this result clearly applies here too. Much 
of the parameter space features realistic levels of accumulation; compare the values of

l shown in Fig. 5c to the mean techno-unit values of 3-7 found by an empirical 
analysis of the complexity of marine foraging technology in a number of Oceanic 
human populations (Kline and Boyd, 2010). However, there are clearly many different
combinations of a and n that will maintain a given mean level 

l in the population; 
thus, observing a given level of accumulation in a population does not allow us to 
completely identify the values of a and n for that population.
[Figure 5 here]
4. Model 3: Combined model
Here we combine our two models to ask under what conditions cultural traditions 
become cumulative. Imagine that each trait in Model 1 comes in the infinite number 
of levels described in Model 2, and that instead of choosing only one cultural 
demonstrator, naive individuals choose n cultural demonstrators, learn from them, and
then both invent new traits and improve existing ones. The structure of the traits and 
trait levels in this model is shown in Fig. 6. As illustrated in the figure, the difference 
between traits and trait levels is that ‘traits’ measure the quantity of cultural traits and 
‘trait level’ measures their complexity. The combined model then simulates the 
dynamics of independent cumulative traits within and between populations that 
interact by migration. To fully analyse this combined model, a choice must be made as
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to how cumulative traits are improved; whether, for example, there is a fixed expected
number of improvements per individual, or whether more knowledgeable individuals 
make on average more improvements. Unfortunately there is little empirical evidence 
on this question.
[Figure 6 here]
Without deciding this one way or another, we can still make useful statements about 
the combined model. Consider the expected number of different traits S in a 
population. If n = 1, Strimling et al. (2009) derived an analytical approximation for S, 
which shows that, for realistic but high values of these parameters, say N = 100, a = 
0.9, and μ = 0.5, then S ≈ 133 traits. On the other hand, if n > 1 no analytical 
approximation for S is known, but we can approximate S by following Strimling et al. 
and noting that S = μNT, where T is the expected lifetime, in generations, of a newly 
invented trait. We conducted simulations that showed that even for very small values 
of the parameters which satisfy the criterion an > 1, say N = 30, a = 0.65, and n = 2, 
then T  ≈ 100, and T increases very rapidly with increases in the parameters. 
Assuming additionally a low value for innovativeness, e.g. μ = 0.1, then S ≈ 300 traits
(Fig. 7) and rises very quickly into the thousands and tens of thousands of traits with 
increases in the parameters. Moreover, the condition an >1 is also the condition for 
cumulative culture to arise, as noted above.
[Figure 7 here]
5. Discussion
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Our models give results that mimic the phenomena of between-population cultural 
traditions and cumulative culture in reasonably realistic ways. In our model of cultural
traditions (Model 1) we find that realistic differences between populations are 
maintained despite assuming that all individuals invent the same traits in the same 
order, individuals learn from only a single demonstrator, and despite frequent 
migration between populations. This occurs because traits die out with non-negligible 
frequency, and most traits do not spread beyond their inventor. In our model of 
cumulative culture (Model 2), we find that the accuracy of social learning and the 
number of cultural demonstrators interact to determine the cumulative level of a trait 
that a population can stably maintain, and that portions of the parameter space feature 
realistic levels of accumulation.
Results from Model 1 show that it is surprisingly easy to generate realistic cultural 
traditions, defined as moderately dissimilar trait profiles in different populations 
linked by migration, in contrast to the lack of spread of any cultural traits (the absence
of culture), or the homogenisation of all populations to an identical trait profile (the 
absence of traditions). Inter-population similarity increases with social learning 
accuracy, population size and migration rate, but traditions reliably emerge at broad 
ranges of values of these parameters rather than a specific range. Even assuming very 
inaccurate social learning (e.g. a = 0.1), as is often claimed to characterize non-human
social learning, we still obtain values of inter-population similarity that match those 
found empirically, at realistic population sizes and migration rates (Fig. 2). In general,
Model 1 is in line with analyses indicating that behavioural traditions in non-human 
primates are cultural rather than genetic (Lycett et al., 2007; 2010), and in fact 
suggests that stable cultural traditions may be more widespread in nature than 
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currently thought. Indeed, since the landmark paper by Whiten et al. (1999), more and
more cultural traditions have been identified in diverse species as researchers have 
begun to look for such patterns (Laland and Galef, 2009). Furthermore, the time series
in Fig. 1a imply that phenomena such as chimpanzee cultures have inherent historical 
dimensions (Lycett, 2010), which have begun to be investigated using archaeological 
(Haslam et al., 2009) and phylogenetic (Lycett et al., 2010) methods. On the grounds 
of phylogenetic homology, we might also therefore expect traditions in prehistoric 
hominins to have displayed similar historical dynamics (Kuhn, 2004; Lycett, 2013).
Results from Model 2 imply that cumulative culture is more difficult to generate: note
the large parameter space in Fig. 5c where accumulation does not occur (i.e. 

l = 1). 
Cumulative culture requires some combination of high fidelity social learning and 
multiple demonstrators, replicating the findings of previous macroscopic (Henrich, 
2004; Lewis and Laland, 2012) and non-cumulative (Enquist et al., 2010) models. The
relative unimportance of individuals’ innovativeness is supported by comparative 
work showing that humans appear to possess unusually high-fidelity social learning, 
and are roughly comparable in their individual learning abilities, compared to other 
great apes (Dean et al., 2012; Herrmann et al., 2007). This reinforces arguments that 
humans inhabit a ‘cultural niche’ (Boyd et al., 2011), characterized by faithful social 
learning rather than particularly enhanced individual cognitive abilities.
The dependence of cumulative culture on two different factors may help to explain its 
rarity in nature. Our analysis of the combined Model 3 reinforced this further, 
showing that social learning accuracy and number of demonstrators interact to 
generate two qualitative regimes dictating both number of traits and trait complexity. 
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When an <1, the number of traits known in the population is relatively low and there 
is no cumulative culture. When an >1, many traits are known in the population and 
there can be cumulative culture. To our knowledge, this is the first time this link 
between trait number and trait complexity has been drawn. It seems plausible that 
these regimes correspond qualitatively to nonhuman and human cultures, respectively:
human culture is not only cumulative, as noted in the Introduction, but also has a huge
number of both cumulative and non-cumulative traits (see Mesoudi et al., 2004 for 
estimations of the magnitude of human cultural variation).
We caution that the models we have presented contain many simplifying assumptions.
We assumed that our parameters (e.g. innovativeness, social learning accuracy) 
operate identically across all individuals, whereas in reality these probably vary across
individuals. The extent to which this individual variation is important, or just averages
out at the population level, remains to be determined. More complex and realistic 
social learning biases are possible, such as copying successful individuals (Mesoudi, 
2008) or conforming to the group majority (Henrich and Boyd, 1998). However, we 
note that adding such biases is not straightforward given the ambiguous and often 
conflicting evidence across non-human species for biases such as conformity (van 
Leeuwen and Haun, 2013). Moreover, we might expect in some cases that such biases
will magnify our findings: conformity, for example, emphasises between-population 
variation (Henrich and Boyd, 1998), thus reinforcing our conclusion that cultural 
traditions should be commonplace. Another interesting question is whether our 
assumption in Model 2 that individuals copy n demonstrators once per generation is 
reasonable. It is also possible that individuals may sample the same demonstrator(s) 
multiple times over their lifetime. Whether multiple learning trials, as well as (or 
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instead of) access to multiple models, facilitates cumulative culture, and which of 
these is a more realistic assumption, remains to be explored.
The emergence of cumulative culture in human evolution is sometimes framed in 
terms of cognition vs. demography: was there some genetically-derived change in 
hominin cognition such that social learning became more accurate (e.g. via imitation 
or teaching) and which allowed cumulative culture to take off (Klein, 2009), or did 
cumulative culture emerge when populations became large enough to support 
increasing cultural complexity (Henrich, 2004; Powell et al., 2009)? Our models 
suggest that the answer to this question is unlikely to be one or the other, and the 
interaction between social learning accuracy and number of demonstrators is key. We 
also note that our (and other modellers’) parameters do not necessarily neatly map 
onto ‘cognition’ and ‘demography’. While it is possible that social learning accuracy 
improved through some genetically-based adaptation for imitation or theory of mind, 
it could equally have increased through purely cultural means. Examples of this in 
recent history might include the invention of writing or the printing press, which 
would have dramatically reduced errors in cultural transmission (see Mesoudi, 2011 
for a cumulative culture model incorporating such cultural innovations). Some kind of
prehistoric equivalent may have similarly driven increases in early hominin social 
learning accuracy, and hence cumulative culture. Similarly, an increase in the number 
of demonstrators may have depended straightforwardly on the overall population size.
Alternatively, it may have required cognitive changes that allowed a shift from 
vertical uniparental cultural transmission to ‘many-to-one’ cultural transmission 
(Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1981), independently of overall population size. 
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Modelling alone cannot ultimately address such questions, but can guide comparative 
and archaeological study to begin to answer them.
In conclusion, we have presented a set of models that extend and combine previous 
theoretical findings concerning the emergence of cultural traditions and cumulative 
culture. Regarding the former, we find that empirically realistic patterns of cultural 
traditions are surprisingly easy to generate with minimal assumptions, supporting 
recent work suggesting that cultural traditions are widespread in nature. Regarding the
latter, we reinforce previous findings that cumulative culture can only emerge through
an interaction of social learning accuracy and number of demonstrators, and that these
conditions favour both a rapid increase in the number and cumulative complexity of 
cultural traits. We suggest that this two-parameter threshold is why cumulative culture
is restricted to just our own species.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by Leverhulme Trust Research Project Grant F/07 
476/AR awarded to AM and SJL. We thank Jeremy Kendal, Rachel Kendal and Peter 
Richerson for comments on an earlier draft.
19
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
References
Aoki, K., Wakano, J. Y., Feldman, M. W., 2005. The emergence of social learning in a
temporally changing environment: A theoretical model. Current Anthropology 
46, 334-340.
Basalla, G., 1988. The evolution of technology. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge.
Boesch, C., Head, J., Robbins, M. M., 2009. Complex tool sets for honey extraction 
among chimpanzees in Loango National Park, Gabon. Journal of Human 
Evolution 56, 560-569.
Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., 1985. Culture and the evolutionary process. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., 1996. Why culture is common, but cultural evolution is 
rare. Proceedings of The British Academy 88, 77-93.
Boyd, R., Richerson, P. J., Henrich, J., 2011. The cultural niche: Why social learning 
is essential for human adaptation. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences 108, 10918-10925.
Catchpole, C. K., Slater, P. J. B., 1995. Bird song: Biological themes and variations. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., Feldman, M. W., 1981. Cultural transmission and evolution. 
Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton.
d'Errico, F., Stringer, C. B., 2011. Evolution, revolution or saltation scenario for the 
emergence of modern cultures? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society B: Biological Sciences 366, 1060-1069.
20
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
Dean, L. G., Kendal, R. L., Schapiro, S. J., Thierry, B., Laland, K. N., 2012. 
Identification of the social and cognitive processes underlying human 
cumulative culture. Science 335, 1114-1118.
Dean, L. G., Vale, G. L., Laland, K. N., Flynn, E., Kendal, R. L., 2013. Human 
cumulative culture: A comparative perspective. Biological Reviews.
Enquist, M., Eriksson, K., Ghirlanda, S., 2007. Critical social learning: A solution to 
Rogers' paradox of nonadaptive culture. American Anthropologist 109, 727-
734.
Enquist, M., Ghirlanda, S., Eriksson, K., 2011. Modelling the evolution and diversity 
of cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 366, 
412-423.
Enquist, M., Strimling, P., Eriksson, K., Laland, K., Sjostrand, J., 2010. One cultural 
parent makes no culture. Animal Behaviour 79, 1353-1362.
Fragaszy, D. M., Perry, S., 2003. The biology of traditions: Models and evidence. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Galef, B. G., Laland, K. N., 2005. Social learning in animals: Empirical studies and 
theoretical models. BioScience 55, 489-499.
Haslam, M., Hernandez-Aguilar, A., Ling, V., Carvalho, S., de La Torre, I., 
DeStefano, A., Du, A., Hardy, B., Harris, J., Marchant, L., 2009. Primate 
archaeology. Nature 460, 339-344.
Helfman, G. S., Schultz, E. T., 1984. Social transmission of behavioral traditions in a 
coral-reef fish. Animal Behaviour 32, 379-384.
Henrich, J., 2004. Demography and cultural evolution: How adaptive cultural 
processes can produce maladaptive losses - the Tasmanian case. American 
Antiquity 69, 197-214.
21
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., 1998. The evolution of conformist transmission and the 
emergence of between-group differences. Evolution and Human Behavior 19, 
215-241.
Herrmann, E., Call, J., Hernandez-Lloreda, M. V., Hare, B., Tomasello, M., 2007. 
Humans have evolved specialized skills of social cognition: The cultural 
intelligence hypothesis. Science 317, 1360-1366.
Hill, K. R., Barton, M., Hurtado, A. M., 2009. The emergence of human uniqueness. 
Evolutionary Anthropology 18, 187-200.
Hill, K. R., Walker, R. S., Bozivecic, M., Eder, J., Headland, T., Hewlett, B., Hurtado, 
A. M., Marlowe, F., Wiessner, P., Wood, B., 2011. Co-residence patterns in 
hunter-gatherer societies show unique human social structure. Science 331, 
1286-1289.
Hiraiwa-Hasegawa, M., Hasegawa, T., Nishida, T., 1984. Demographic study of a 
large-sized unit-group of chimpanzees in the Mahale Mountains, Tanzania: A 
preliminary report. Primates 25, 401-413.
Klein, R. G., 2009. The human career: Human biological and cultural origins. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.
Kline, M. A., Boyd, R., 2010. Population size predicts technological complexity in 
Oceania. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 277, 2559-
2564.
Kuhn, S., 2004. Evolutionary perspectives on technology and technological change. 
World Archaeology 36, 561-570.
Laland, K. N., Plotkin, H. C., 1990. Social learning and social transmission of 
foraging information in Norway Rats (Rattus norvegicus). Animal Learning 
and Behavior 18, 246-251.
22
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
Laland, K. N., Galef, B. G., 2009. The question of animal culture. Harvard University 
Press.
Leadbeater, E., Chittka, L., 2007. Social learning in insects—from miniature brains to 
consensus building. Current Biology 17, 703-713.
Lehmann, L., Aoki, K., Feldman, M. W., 2011. On the number of independent cultural
traits carried by individuals and populations. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society B 366, 424-435.
Lewis, H. M., Laland, K. N., 2012. Transmission fidelity is the key to the build-up of 
cumulative culture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 367, 
2171-2180.
Lycett, S. J., 2010. The importance of history in definitions of culture: Implications 
from phylogenetic approaches to the study of social learning in chimpanzees. 
Learning & Behavior 38, 252-264.
Lycett, S. J., 2013. Cultural transmission theory and fossil hominin behaviour: A 
discussion of epistemological and methodological strengths. In: Ellen, R. F., et
al., Eds.), Understanding cultural transmission in anthropology: A critical 
synthesis. Berghahn, New York.
Lycett, S. J., von Cramon-Taubadel, N., 2013. A 3D morphometric analysis of surface 
geometry in Levallois cores: Patterns of stability and variability across regions
and their implications. Journal of Archaeological Science 40, 1508-1517.
Lycett, S. J., Collard, M., McGrew, W. C., 2007. Phylogenetic analyses of behavior 
support existence of culture among wild chimpanzees. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences 104, 17588.
Lycett, S. J., Collard, M., McGrew, W. C., 2010. Are behavioral differences among 
wild chimpanzee communities genetic or cultural? An assessment using tool-
23
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
use data and phylogenetic methods. American Journal of Physical 
Anthropology 142, 461-467.
May, K. O., 1966. Quantitative growth of the mathematical literature. Science 154, 
1672.
Mesoudi, A., 2008. An experimental simulation of the 'copy-successful-individuals' 
cultural learning strategy: Adaptive landscapes, producer-scrounger dynamics 
and informational access costs. Evolution and Human Behavior 29, 350-363.
Mesoudi, A., 2011. Variable cultural acquisition costs constrain cumulative cultural 
evolution. PLOS One 6, e18239.
Mesoudi, A., Whiten, A., Laland, K. N., 2004. Is human cultural evolution 
Darwinian? Evidence reviewed from the perspective of the Origin of Species. 
Evolution 58, 1-11.
Nishida, T., Matsusaka, T., McGrew, W. C., 2009. Emergence, propagation or 
disappearance of novel behavioral patterns in the habituated chimpanzees of 
Mahale: A review. Primates 50, 23-36.
O'Malley, R. C., Wallauer, W., Murray, C. M., Goodall, J., 2012. The appearance and 
spread of ant fishing among the Kasekela chimpanzees of Gombe. Current 
Anthropology 53, 650-663.
Oswalt, W. H., 1976. An anthropological analysis of food-getting technology. Wiley, 
New York.
Perry, S., Panger, M., Rose, L. M., Baker, M., Gros-Luis, J., Jack, K., Mackinnon, K. 
C., Manson, J., Fedigan, L., Pyle, K., 2003. Traditions in wild white-faced 
capuchin monkeys. In: Fragaszy, D., Perry, S., (Eds.), The biology of 
traditions: Models and evidence. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 
391-425.
24
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
Powell, A., Shennan, S., Thomas, M. G., 2009. Late Pleistocene demography and the 
appearance of modern human behavior. Science 324, 1298-1301.
Pradhan, G. R., Tennie, C., van Schaik, C. P., 2012. Social organization and the 
evolution of cumulative technology in apes and hominins. Journal of Human 
Evolution 63, 180-190.
Price, D. J. S., 1963. Little science, big science. Columbia Univ. Press, New York.
Roche, H., 2005. From simple flaking to shaping: Stone knapping evolution among 
early hominids. In: Roux, V., Bril, B., (Eds.), Stone knapping: The necessary 
conditions for a uniquely hominid behaviour. McDonald Institute 
Monographs, Cambridge, pp. 35-48.
Rogers, A. R., 1988. Does biology constrain culture? American Anthropologist 90, 
819-831.
Sanz, C. M., Schoning, C., Morgan, D. B., 2010. Chimpanzees prey on army ants with
specialized tool set. American Journal of Primatology 72, 17-24.
Simão, J., 2002. Tools evolve: The artificial selection and evolution of paleolithic 
stone tools. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25, 419.
Strimling, P., Sjostrand, J., Enquist, M., Eriksson, K., 2009. Accumulation of 
independent cultural traits. Theoretical Population Biology 76, 77-83.
Tomasello, M., 1999. The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, MA.
van Leeuwen, E. J. C., Haun, D., 2013. Conformity in nonhuman primates: Fad or 
fact? Evolution and Human Behavior 34, 1-7.
van Schaik, C. P., Ancrenaz, M., Borgen, G., Galdikas, B., Knott, C. D., Singleton, I., 
Suzuki, A., Utami, S. S., Merrill, M., 2003. Orangutan cultures and the 
evolution of material culture. Science 299, 102-105.
25
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
Whiten, A., Goodall, J., McGrew, W. C., Nishida, T., Reynolds, V., Sugiyama, Y., 
Tutin, C. E. G., Wrangham, R. W., Boesch, C., 1999. Cultures in chimpanzees.
Nature 399, 682-685.
Wilder, R. L., 1968. Evolution of mathematical concepts. Open University Press, 
Milton Keynes.
26
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
Figures
Figure 1. One simulation of the cultural differences model. (a) Time series of the 
number of traits S known in each population. The initial part of the simulation is not 
shown. The dashed line shows the exact expected value derived by Strimling et al 
(2009, Equation 3). (b) Trait-profiles of each population at the end of the simulation, 
with grey cells marking the presence of a given trait in a given population and white 
cells marking its absence. The average similarity 

s between the populations is 0.71. 
Parameter values: N = 100, a = 0.9, μ = 0.1, m = 0, p = 5.
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Figure 2. The effect of (a) the population size N, (b) the accuracy of social learning a, 
and (c) both, on the mean similarity between populations 

s. Panel (c) shows the value 
of 

s on a contour plot in an analogous way to a geographical map showing the height 
of a mountain at various points in space. All panels show the value found after 2000 
timesteps, averaged over 1500 simulations with parameter values μ = 0.1, p = 5, and 
m = 0; in (a) a = 0.9 and in (b) N = 50.
28
626
627
628
629
630
631
29
632
Figure 3. The effect of the migration rate m on (a) the mean number of different traits 
across all populations 

S  and (b) the mean similarity between populations 

s. Both 
panels show the value found after 2000 timesteps, averaged over 2000 simulations 
with parameter values N = 50, a = 0.9, μ = 0.1, and p = 5.
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Figure 4. One simulation of the cumulative culture model. (a) Time series of the mean
level 

l 

lknown in the population. (b) The distribution of levels in the population at 
the end of the simulation. Parameter values: N = 100, a = 0.7, n = 3, μ = 0.1.
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Figure 5. The effect of (a) the number of cultural models n, (b) the accuracy of social 
learning a, and (c) both, on the mean trait level 

l maintained in the population. All 
panels show the value found after 10000 timesteps, averaged over 20 simulations, 
with N = 100 and μ = 0.1; in (a) a = 0.9 and in (b) n = 3.
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Figure 6. A schematic illustration of the structure of the traits and trait levels for one 
hypothetical individual in the combined Model 3. In this example, the individual 
knows trait number 1 to level 5, trait number 2 to level 4, trait number 3 only at the 
first level, does not know trait number 4, and knows trait number 5 to level 2.
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Figure 7. The number of traits known in the population in one simulation of the 
combined model. Parameter values: N = 30, n = 2, a = 0.7, μ = 0.1, m = 0, p = 1.
34
655
656
Appendix
Imagine, in Strimling et al’s model (i.e. with m = 0), that a focal individual has just 
invented a new trait. In the next timestep, one of three things can happen: the trait can 
be lost because the individual dies, the trait can continue to be known only by the 
inventor, or another individual can learn the trait. Let us denote the probabilities of 
these three events by plost, pkept and pcopied. The trait will be lost if the inventor is 
randomly picked to die; thus,
plost = 

1
N
The trait will be learned by another individual if the inventor does not die, and the
individual randomly picks the inventor to learn from, and is successful at learning; 
thus,
pcopied = 

(1 1N )(
1
N 1)a 
a
N
Finally,
pkept = 1 - plost - pcopied = 

1 1N 
a
N 
N  a 1
N
What is the probability P(t) that the trait is learnt by another individual for the first 
time exactly t timesteps after it was invented? For this to happen, the trait must 
continue to be known only by the inventor for t - 1 timesteps, and must then be learnt 
by another individual on the tth. Thus,

P(t)  pkeptt1 pcopied  (
N  a 1
N )
t1 a
N
Finally, what is the probability that the trait will ever spread beyond its inventor? This 
happens if P(t) ever happens, i.e. with probability

P(t)
t1

  (N  a 1N )
t1 a
Nt1


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Using the standard identity for infinite geometric series, this can be shown to be equal
to

a
1 a
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